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WILSON V. UNITED STATES: THE NARROW
LINE BETWEEN INNIS AND EDWARDS
In Wilson v. United States,' the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
ruled that once a suspect invokes the right to remain silent, a law enforce-
ment officer fails to "scrupulously honor" this right by answering a sus-
pect's questions in a manner designed to elicit an incriminating response.2
The Wilson decision expands Supreme Court interpretation of custodial
interrogation while clarifying the guidelines of permissible police investi-
gatory techniques.
Since Miranda v. Arizona,3 the United States Supreme Court has ex-
pounded on permissible police conduct in the context of protecting indi-
vidual rights. In Miranda, the Supreme Court criticized coercive police
interrogation techniques and outlined the significant presumptive rights of
the accused. The Miranda Court set forth a two-prong test to determine
whether a suspect's right to remain silent has been honored. First, did the
suspect invoke the right to remain silent? Second, if not, did the suspect
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive that right?4 The Court em-
phasized that until "procedural safeguards" are established to protect the
right to remain silent and to "assure that the exercise of the right will be
scrupulously honored," the two-prong test must be applied.5 In the course
of its holding, the Miranda Court defined custodial interrogation as "ques-
tioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any signifi-
1. 444 A.2d 25 (D.C. 1982).
2. Id. at 28-29.
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. Id at 444. The Court set forth what has become a familiar litany:
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The
defendant may waive effectuation of these rights provided the waiver is made vol-
untarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
Id The Court emphasized that if a suspect "indicates in any manner and at any stage of the
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no more
questioning." Id at 444-45. It continued: "Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates
in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him."
Id at 445.
5. Id at 479. By "procedural safeguards," the Court may well be referring to both
legislative and internal changes mandating proper police behavior. See generally Miranda,
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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cant way."6
Nine years later, however, the Supreme Court qualified its seemingly
absolute Miranda test and ruled that there must be no further interrogation
once the suspect has invoked his right to remain silent. In Michigan v.
Mosey, 7 the Court noted that the Miranda decision did not "state under
what circumstances, if any, a resumption of questioning is permissible."'
The Mosley Court indicated that this omission fostered the creation of
"wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and
deprive[d] suspects of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent as-
sessments of their interests."9 The Court concluded that the "reasonable
and faithful interpretation" of Miranda would ensure that the suspect has
been notified of his right to remain silent, and that this right has been
"scrupulously honored."'° In determining whether a suspect's rights have
been so honored, courts must examine the nature of the interrogation. "
Because of Miranda's ambiguous definition of what constitutes interro-
gation, and Mosley's failure to clarify such definition, the Supreme Court
in Rhode Island v. Innis2 was again faced with determining in what cir-
cumstances Miranda warnings are necessary. The Court held that "the
Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is sub-
6. Id. at 444 (emphasis in original).
7. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
8. Id at 101. The Mosley court, however, pointed to a footnote in Miranda that cited
circumstances where resumption of questioning may be permissible:
If an individual indicates his desire to remain silent, but has an attorney present,
there may be some circumstances in which further questioning would be permissi-
ble. In the absence of evidence of overbearing, statements then made in the pres-
ence of counsel might be free of the compelling influence of the interrogation
process and might fairly be construed as a waiver of the privilege for purposes of
these statements.
id at 101-02 n.8 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 n.44).
9. 423 U.S. at 102. The Court, in referring to the familiar Miranda warnings, supra
note 4, continued: "Clearly, therefore, neither this passage nor any other passage in the
Miranda opinion can sensibly be read to create a per se proscription of infinite duration
upon any further questioning by any police officer ... once the person in custody has indi-
cated a desire to remain silent." 1d. at 102-03.
10. Id. at 104. The Court concluded that the "critical safeguard" is the suspect's "right
to cut off questioning." Id.
I1. Id. at 103-04.
12. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). The suspect was arrested on charges of murdering a cab driver
with a sawed-off shotgun. After being read his Miranda rights, the suspect was transported
to the station. The officers transporting the suspect engaged in a conversation, revealing that
a school for the handicapped was located near the area in which the weapon was missing.
One officer expressed his hope that a "little girl" would not find the weapon and hurt herself
on the way to school. The suspect, apparently overhearing the conversation, interrupted the
officers and told them to turn around and return to the site of his arrest, whereupon he led
the officers to the gun. Id at 294.
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jected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent."13 It de-
fined the functional equivalent of interrogation as including "not only
express questioning, but also. . . any words or actions on the part of the
police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect."' 4 The Innis Court ruled that
law enforcement officers must not initiate further attempts to interrogate
the suspect after he has invoked his right to counsel or his right to remain
silent.' 5 Accordingly, it developed a two-prong test to be applied to any
discussion between police officers and a suspect that takes place after the
suspect has invoked either of these two rights. The first prong requires the
court to determine which party initiated the meeting or conversation at
issue. 6 The second prong requires the court to determine whether the of-
ficers employed any tactics that they "should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."' 7 If either of these
prongs indicates that law enforcement officers acted improperly in ob-
taining the confession, the statement is inadmissible.'"
In Edwards v. Arizona,'9 the Supreme Court emphasized the application
of the first prong of the Innis test as a limitation on questioning. The
Court held that when a suspect expresses a desire to have an attorney pres-
ent, he "is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until coun-
sel has been made available to him, [or] unless the accused himself initiates
further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police."2
The Edwards Court cautioned, however, that merely because the suspect
initiates a conversation, he does not thereby immediately waive his rights.
It further observed that "in the course of a meeting initiated by the accused
. . . it is likely that the officers will say or do something that clearly would
13. Id at 300-01.
14. Id. at 301. The Court held, however, that the officers' conversation in Innis did not
amount to the functional equivalent of interrogation, in part because the officers could not
have known that their "offhand remarks" would evoke the response they did. Id. at 302-03.
15. Id at 298-300. See also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445 (if suspect "indicates in any man-
ner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him"); but see
Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104 n.10 (1975) (distinguishing between invoking the right to remain
silent and the right to an attorney).
16. 446 U.S. at 298.
17. Id. at 301.
18. Id. at 291, 298-301.
19. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
20. Id at 484-85. The suspect requested an attorney, and questioning ceased. The fol-
lowing morning, Edwards was told he "had to" speak with detectives waiting to see him,
whereupon he confessed. Id. at 479. The Court held that the fruits of the police-initiated
session were inadmissible because no interrogation was permissible until the request for an
attorney had been honored, unless the suspect had himself initiated the meeting. Id at 484-
85.
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be 'interrogation.' "2, Under these circumstances, a court must focus on
whether the suspect knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his
rights.
22
The line of Supreme Court cases since Miranda has clearly emphasized
the rights of the suspect to have counsel and to remain silent. To safe-
guard these rights, the Court will not tolerate law enforcement behavior
that is designed to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The
court of appeals has had two recent opportunities to apply the definition of
interrogation enunciated in Innis.23 Its first opportunity arose in United
States v. Alexander .24 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals applied
the Innis test, concluding that a suspect's rights had not been "scrupulously
honored" where the suspect had not been permitted to "cut-off question-
"925 ining. Then, in Robertson v. United States,26 the court held that an of-
ficer's question, "Do you know why I'm here?" was not the Innis
functional equivalent of custodial interrogation. The court noted that the
officer had interrupted the ensuing confession to read the suspect his
rights.27
In 1982, in Wilson v. United States,28 the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals broadened the definition of custodial interrogation to include an-
swers to a suspect's questions that are designed to elicit an incriminating
response. Joseph Wilson was arrested on a military base in Virginia and
was subsequently read his rights. The following morning, two District of
Columbia homicide detectives read Wilson his rights again, whereupon he
stated that he had "nothing to tell."'29 While riding back to the District of
Columbia, Wilson asked the detectives how they had obtained his name.
The detectives then discussed the case with Wilson, providing only general
21. Id. at 486 n.9.
22. Id.
23. These District of Columbia Court of Appeals' decisions were decided in the same
Term as Edwards, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). For a discussion of Edwards, see supra notes 19-22
and accompanying text.
24. 428 A.2d 42 (D.C. 1981). See Wilson, 444 A.2d 25, 28 (D.C. 1982) ("[t]his court
adopted the Innis test in United States v. Alexander...").
25. Alexander, 428 A.2d at 49-50. The suspect indicated that she was unwilling to an-
swer questions without an attorney present. Id at 45. The officer then stated "we know
what happened" or "we know you are responsible for the stabbing," id., which the officer
later admitted was "an interrogation technique designed to get her to talk." Id. at 45 n.9.
The officer subsequently remained in the room, asking the suspect questions concerning
"paperwork," until she confessed. Id. at 45.
26. 429 A.2d 192 (D.C. 1981).
27. Id at 195.
28. 444 A.2d 25 (D.C. 1982). Judge Mack wrote the majority opinion, joined by Judge
Kelly. Judge Pryor dissented.
29. Id at 26-27.
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answers to his questions. 30 Following booking procedures and a fresh set
of Miranda warnings, the detectives drove Wilson to the Superior Court
cellblock. During the drive, the detectives answered Wilson's questions
more specifically. 31 Upon approaching the cellblock's entrance, Wilson
asked the detectives to stop the car, and requested the identity of their
witness. The detectives complied, and Wilson was "flabbergasted." 32 The
detectives then suggested to Wilson that he make a statement.33 The trial
court found Wilson guilty, primarily on the basis of this statement.
34
At trial, the detectives admitted that they had previously discussed the
strategy of supplying Wilson with increasingly more specific information
in the hope of "getting him to talk." One of the detectives testified that
they had employed a "deliberate strategy" designed to cause Wilson to
"change his mind and give us a statement. ' 35 The court of appeals re-
versed the trial court's conviction, holding that the detectives had failed to
"scrupulously honor" Wilson's right to remain silent.36 Judge Mack, writ-
ing for the court, agreed with the trial court's finding that Wilson had in-
voked his right to remain silent when he stated he had "nothing to tell," as
well as when he subsequently failed to waive his rights.37 The Wilson
30. Id. at 27.
31. Wilson was read his rights at least once more before arriving at his final destination.
Id.
32. Id Apparently, the detectives told Wilson that he had been identified by a witness.
Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 26.
35. 1d at 27. The relevant portion of the cross-examination is as follows:
Q. And your prior discussion with Detective Chaney about whether or not to talk
to him further, in those discussions, was there any indication of what might be your
purpose in revealing such information?
A. We felt if we were more specific, perhaps Mr. Wilson would decide to change
his mind and give us a statement.
Q. You were working in effect on Mr. Wilson, to abandon the-to induce Mr.
Wilson to abandon the-his position of the exercise of his rights?
A. I don't like the terminology, but I'll say yes.
Q. It was a deliberate strategy, was it not?
A. It (sic] would say it was deliberate only that he initiated the questions of us.
Id.
36. Id. at 26.
37. Id at 28. Judge Pryor dissented, arguing that because Wilson had initiated the
questions, the "failure of the police to answer appellant's questions in an immediate and
exhaustive fashion" did not constitute an impermissible form of interrogation. Id. at 32. He
claimed that the court's holding would constitute "a per se rule which both the Supreme
Court and this court have previously rejected." Id at 33. For a discussion refuting this
contention, see supra note 9 and accompanying text. Judge Pryor's dissent, however, em-
bodies a selective use of precedent as supporting authority. He believed the fact that Wilson
had initiated the conversations should have been dispositive. Even if the record were clear
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court rendered its decision in light of Innis, finding that the detectives'
deliberate strategy of answering questions in a manner designed to elicit
an incriminating response constituted the functional equivalent of an
interrogation.38
The Wilson decision rests comfortably between the Supreme Court rul-
ings in Innis and Edwards. The Supreme Court held in Innis that an inter-
rogation includes words or actions by police designed to elicit an
incriminating response.39 In Wilson, the detectives admitted that they had
designed their answers to Wilson's questions precisely for the purpose of
changing Wilson's mind about making a statement.4 ° Innis, however, did
not deal with the initiation of conversation by the suspect. In Edwards, the
Supreme Court held that in order for his statements to be admissible, the
suspect must initiate further meetings and conversations after invoking the
right to remain silent. 4' The Court noted, though, that simply because the
on this point, see infra note 38, the minority analysis remains flawed. Judge Pryor ignored
the Innis holding that police conduct need only be designed to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse for it to be interrogation. He also failed to address the footnote in Edwards that
explicitly cautioned against a per se initiation rule. See 451 U.S. at 486 n.9. Finally, Judge
Pryor failed to comment on the fact that the detectives had urged Wilson to make a state-
ment-an action that would appear to render any statement inadmissible under the circum-
stances. Wilson, 444 A.2d at 27.
38. 444 A.2d at 28-30. The court cited United States v. Alexander, 428 A.2d 42 (D.C.
1981), for an example of interrogation techniques that were not in question form. InAlexan-
der, the officer told the suspect he knew what she had done, eventually eliciting a confession.
Id at 45. The Wilson court also analyzed events in light of Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96
(1975), and concluded that a fifth amendment violation had occurred. In applying the fac-
tors which it deemed relevant, see infra note 46 and accompanying text, the Wilson court
stated: "In Mosley, the Court noted the factors which are to be considered in determining
whether a suspect's right to cut off questioning has been scrupulously honored." 444 A.2d at
29. The Wilson court observed that despite the dispute over which party initiated the discus-
sions, id, the detectives had discussed the case with the appellant over a four-hour period.
The court decided that this lent a "potentially coercive atmosphere" to the discussion, id,
and ruled that the appellant had not intentionally abandoned his fifth amendment rights.
Id. The record is unclear as to whether "the appellant's 'curiosity' was piqued initially as a
result of the detectives having told him about the existence of an unnamed witness to the
alleged crime or the detectives having told him of the witness was a result of the appellant's
questioning. ... Id. at 29 n.7. The court concluded that it did not need to arrive at a
finding on the initiation issue because the case could be disposed of on the issue of eliciting
an incriminating response. Id
The court of appeals also discussed the appellant's claim of a sixth amendment violation.
It decided that because the sixth amendment right was never invoked, no abridgement oc-
curred. Id at 30.
39. 446 U.S. at 301.
40. 444 A.2d at 27.
41. 451 U.S. at 484-85.
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suspect is the initiator, he does not automatically waive his rights.42 While
it appears that Wilson initiated the conversation with the detectives, the
Wilson court found that the detectives had nonetheless planned their an-
swers in anticipation of "piquing" Wilson's curiosity, thereby laying a trap
for the unwary appellant.43 As the court of appeals aptly noted, the appel-
lant could not have knowingly waived his rights during this procedure. In
addition, the detectives exceeded the question-and-answer format thresh-
old by suggesting to Wilson that he would be better off if he gave them a
statement. 4"
Although the court of appeals could have disposed of Wilson on these
findings alone, it additionally cited Michigan v. Mosley . The court
treated the particular facts present in Mosley as if they constituted a more
generic "test" for the presence or absence of rights violations, while in real-
ity the Mosley court was merely examining the facts to determine whether
the suspect's rights had been violated.46
The ruling in Wilson should not impair police investigative techniques
any more than they are already constricted by Innis and Edwards. Indeed,
by attempting to clarify the role of a law enforcement officer's tactics in
determining admissibility of statements, Wilson may well afford the of-
ficers greater insight into permissible conduct. The case law, including
Wilson, dictates that law enforcement officials not attempt, under any cir-
cumstances, to elicit incriminating responses when the suspect has invoked
either the right to remain silent or the right to an attorney. Although such
an imperative may appear to hamper legitimate investigations, it is also
42. Id at 486 n.9. For a discussion of Edwards, see supra notes 19-22 and accompany-
ing text.
43. 444 A.2d at 29 n.7.
44. Id at 27. The record indicates that no express waiver was given prior to the detec-
tives' encouragement to confess.
45. 423 U.S. 96 (1975). See the discussion of Mosley, supra notes 7-11 and infra note 46
and accompanying text.
46. 444 A.2d at 29. The Wilson court described the relevant factors as follows:
1) Was the suspect advised of his rights and did he orally acknowledge them; 2)
did the police immediately cease questioning and make no attempt to resume or
ask him to reconsider; 3) was there a two hour break between the first and second
interrogations and was the second performed at a different location by a different
officer about a different crime; and 4) were Miranda warnings given before the
second questioning session.
Id. These same factors, however, were listed as facts in Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104. The Mos-
ley court analyzed the facts in this manner to determine if the suspect's "right to cut off
questioning" was respected. Id The Court led into this discussion with: "A review of the
circumstances leading to Mosley's confession reveals that his 'right to cut off questioning'
was fully respected in this case." Id. The Court then listed these factors, which were re-
peated in Wilson. See supra note 38.
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possible that because the Wilson opinion provides clearer guidelines, fewer
cases will be dismissed on Miranda violations. This, in turn, may ulti-
mately reduce the pragmatic cost arising from freed criminals that society
now pays to maintain its high constitutional standards.
The Wilson decision represents a careful and correct analysis of
Supreme Court case law. Although the suspect initiated the conversation
with police officers after invoking his right to remain silent, the court ap-
plied the Innis definition of interrogation, hence interpreting Edwards as a
flexible standard to be used in isolated cases. The Wilson court's interpre-
tation of Mosley to include a "test" does not affect the efficacy of its deci-
sion. Wilson v. United States provides law enforcement officials with
greater clarity as to those practices that will and will not be tolerated by
the courts.
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